sábado, novembro 20, 2010

RE: HHH, a Monarquia e a Democracia (III)


5) um governo democrático pode, se tiver maioria absoluta, ser o equivalente de uma ditadura temporária . O facto de geralmente não resultar em medidas que o público considera como "ditatoriais" não exclui os efeitos mencionados pelo Miguel como naturais numa ditadura temporária (alta preferência temporal que leva à redistribuição acelerada e massiva da sociedade civil para o Estado, sem consideração pelo longo prazo).  Logo, a conclusão do Miguel - mesmo abordando o tema de outra perspectiva - confirma a tese de Hoppe.

6) tendo esgotado o número de mandatos, um executivo não tem necessariamente de se preocupar com reeleições, já que ela lhe está vedada. Logo, o equilíbrio democrático descrito  pelo Miguel não sucede neste caso (e este caso, claro, pode suceder com frequência).

7) mesmo tendo a possibilidade de reeleição, pode ser do interesse do governante democrático não ganhar as eleições (por exemplo, tendo imposto severas restrições - fiscais ou regulatórias - na economia, e antecipando por isso uma recessão ou estagnação económica).

3 comentários:

Miguel Madeira disse...

Acerca da diferença entre uma ditadura temporária e uma maioria abosluta, o tal texto do Mancur Olson:

"A candidate needs only a majority to win, and he might be able to "buy" a majority by transferring income from the population at large to a prospective majority. The taxes needed for this transfer would impair incentives and reduce society's output just as an autocrat's redistribution to himself does. Would this competition to buy votes generate as much distortion of incentives through taxation as a rational autocracy doer? That is, would a vote-buying democratic leader, like the rational autocrat, have an incentive to push tax rates to the revenue-maximizing level?

No. Though both the majority and the autocrat have an encompassing interest in the society because they control tax collections, the majority in addition earns a significant share of the market income of the society, and this gives it a more encompassing interest in the productivity of the society. The majority's interest in its market earnings induces it to redistribute less to itself than an autocrat redistributes to himself. This is evident from considering an option that a democratic majority would have if it were at the revenue-maximizing tax rate. At the revenue-maximizing tax rate, a minuscule change in the tax rates will not alter tax collections. A minuscule increasei n the tax rate will reduce the national income by enough so that even though a larger percentage of income is taken in taxes, the amount collected remains unchanged, and a tiny reductionin the tax rate will increase the national income so much that even though a smaller percentage is taken in taxes, receipts are unchanged. This is the optimal tax rate for the autocrat because changes in the national income affect his income only by changing tax collections.

But a majority at the revenue-maximizing tax rate is bound to increase its income from a reductionin tax rates: when the national income goes up, it not only, like the autocrat, collects taxes on a larger national income but also earns more income in the market. So the optimal tax rate for it is bound to be lower than the autocrat's. The easiest arithmetic example comes from supposing that the revenue-maximizing tax rate is one-third and that the majority earns one-third of the national income in the marketplace. The rational autocrat will then find that the last dollar in taxes that he collects reduces the national income by three dollars. One-third of this loss is his loss, so he just breaks even on this last dollar of tax collection and is at his revenue-maximizing rate. But if a majority mistakenly chose this same tax rate, it would be hurting itself, for it would lose two dollars (the same dollar lost by the autocrat plus one dollar of market income) from the last dollar it collected in taxes. Thus a majority would maximize its total income with a lower tax rate and a smaller redistribution to itself than would be chosen by an autocrat.

More generally, it pays a ruling interest (whether an autocrat, a majority, or any other) to stop redistributing income to itself when the national income falls by the reciprocal of the share of the national income it receives. If the revenue-maximizing tax rate were one-half, an autocrat would stop increasing taxes when the national income fell by two dollars from his last dollar of tax collection. A majority that, say, earned three-fifths of the national income in the market and found it optimal to take one-fifth of the national income to transfer to itself would necessarily be reducing the national income by five-fourths, or $1.25, from the last dollar that it redistributed to itself. Thus the more encompassing an interest-the larger the share of the national income it receives taking all sources together-the less the social losses from its redistributions to itself. Conversely, the narrower the interest, the less it will take account of the social costs of redistributions to itself."

Miguel Madeira disse...

Sobra a maioria absoluta e a ditadura temporária, o tal artigo do Mancur Olson:

A candidate needs only a majority to win, and he might be able to "buy" a majority by transferring income from the population at large to a prospective majority. The taxes needed for this transfer would impair incentives and reduce society's output just as an autocrat's redistribution to himself does. Would this competition to buy votes generate as much distortion of incentives through taxation as a rational autocracy doer? That is, would a vote-buying democratic leader, like the rational autocrat, have an incentive to push tax rates to the revenue-maximizing level?

No. Though both the majority and the autocrat have an encompassing interest in the society because they control tax collections, the majority in addition earns a significant share of the market income of the society, and this gives it a more encompassing interest in the productivity of the society. The majority's interest in its market earnings induces it to redistribute less to itself than an autocrat redistributes to himself. (...)

But a majority at the revenue-maximizing tax rate is bound to increase its income from a reductionin tax rates: when the national income goes up, it not only, like the autocrat, collects taxes on a larger national income but also earns more income in the market. So the optimal tax rate for it is bound to be lower than the autocrat's. (..)

More generally, it pays a ruling interest (whether an autocrat, a majority, or any other) to stop redistributing income to itself when the national income falls by the reciprocal of the share of the national income it receives. If the revenue-maximizing tax rate were one-half, an autocrat would stop increasing taxes when the national income fell by two dollars from his last dollar of tax collection. A majority that, say, earned three-fifths of the national income in the market and found it optimal to take one-fifth of the national income to transfer to itself would necessarily be reducing the national income by five-fourths, or $1.25, from the last dollar that it redistributed to itself. Thus the more encompassing an interest-the larger the share of the national income it receives taking all sources together-the less the social losses from its redistributions to itself. Conversely, the narrower the interest, the less it will take account of the social costs of redistributions to itself.

Miguel Madeira disse...

Por outro lado, o argumento do Olson até seria mais um argumento a favor do sufrágio censitário do que da democracia